Cultural Intelligence and Regional Issues
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National Military Intelligence Association and the 
International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE) 

Intelligence Education and Training Workshop 

November 15, 2012 
Northrop Grumman, Fair Lakes 
12900 Federal Systems Park Dr., Fairfax, VA 22033 

KEYNOTE: Dr. Mark Lowenthal 
President of the Intelligence & Security Academy, IAFIE Executive Director, and former 
Assistant DCI for Analysis & Production 

0800-0900 Registration, Refreshments, and Networking 

0900-1000 Keynote Address: Dr. Mark M. Lowenthal, Executive Director, IAFIE, 
and President, Intelligence & Security Academy 

1000-1100 Panel on Education/Training Policy and Strategic Planning 
Dr. Susan Studds, Provost, NIU (Moderator) 
ODNI OUSD(I) DHS 

1100-1115 Break 

1115-1230 Panel on Programs of the IC Agencies 
CIA’s Kent School DIA’s JMITC, JMAS, and/or LREC 
NSA’s National Cryptologic School FBI Academy or HQ Training Manager 
NGA’s College Marilyn Peterson IC Centers of Academic Excellence 

1230-1330 No-Host Lunch 

1330-1430 Panel on Programs of Traditional Civilian Colleges & Universities 
Georgetown University University of Maryland 
James Madison University CDR Toni Gay, U.S. Coast Guard Academy 
Mercyhurst University Institute of World Politics 

1430-1445 Break 

1445-1545 Panel on Programs of Non-Traditional Colleges & Universities 
AMU Henley-Putnam University 
UMUC Capella University 

1545-1630 Panel on Programs of Professional/Private Associations Supporting Education 
Dr. Bill Spracher, NMIA/IAFIE (Moderator) 
IAFIE AFIO 
NMIA AFCEA 
Kurt Marisa, FAQA 

1630-1645 Wrap-Up, Next Steps, and Adjournment 

Register online at www.nmia.org 

AGENDA SUBJECT TO CHANGE
The theme of this American Intelligence Journal, “Cultural Intelligence and Regional Issues,” is a good example of how much our discipline has changed over the past ten to fifteen years. The term “Cultural Intelligence” is fairly new, so new it is hard to find an official DoD definition. You won’t find it in Joint Publication 1-02 or Joint Publication 2.0. Nor will you find the term acceptably defined in any Intelligence Community documentation on the Web. Several scholarly reviews have held that the IC lacks a systematic framework for understanding what “cultural intelligence” actually means and where it fits in the discipline. According to Webster’s New Ideal Dictionary, it can be defined as “the characteristic features of a civilization including its beliefs, its artistic and material products, and its social institutions.” That works fairly well. Wikipedia defines it this way: “Cultural intelligence, cultural quotient or CQ, is a theory within management and organizational psychology, positing that understanding the impact of an individual’s cultural background on their behavior is essential for effective business.” Close but not quite right for our purposes. One of the earlier scholarly treatments defined cultural intelligence as “a person’s capability to adapt to new cultural contexts” (see Cultural Intelligence: Individual Interactions Across Cultures by P. Christopher Earley and Soon Ang, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003). Their key objective is to address the problem of why people fail to adjust to and understand new cultures. That objective gets to the crux of the recent DoD emphasis on Cultural Intelligence in support of operations—the failure to adapt.

The best working definition for Cultural Intelligence that I found came from Lieutenant Commander (USN) John P. Coles in an article he wrote, “Incorporating Cultural Intelligence into Joint Doctrine,” published in the Joint Information Operations Center publication IO Sphere. This was his definition as an adequate one did not exist:

Cultural intelligence can be defined as an analysis of social, political, economic, and other demographic information that provides understanding of a people or nation’s history, institutions, psychology, beliefs (such as religion), and behaviors. It helps provide understanding as to why a people act as they do and how they think. Cultural intelligence provides a baseline for designing successful strategies to interact with foreign peoples whether they are neutrals, people of an occupied territory, or enemies.

Treatises on Cultural Intelligence are rare before 2005. Cultural Intelligence is more of a product (of analysis) than a discipline, and has developed significantly as an outgrowth of our engagements in Southeast Asia, e.g., the

Human Terrain System concept or then-MG Flynn’s 2010 Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan. NMIA recently concluded its Fall 2012 Intelligence Symposium titled “Foreign Engagement & Global Coverage under the New Defense Strategy: FAOs, Security Cooperation and the Defense Attaché System.” The symposium was all about FAOs, Languages, Attaches, Foreign Engagement, Security Cooperation, Partner Relationships, Area Knowledge, Human Terrain, and Interagency/Country Teams, all the makings of Cultural Intelligence. This was an outstanding event co-sponsored with the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Association. We hope to make many of the presentations available either on our webpage or in a future AIJ. LTG Michael Flynn, now Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, was the keynote speaker, reflecting on “Accelerating Change – Today’s Defense Intelligence Imperative.”

In several recent forums LTG Flynn has emphasized the dramatic and dynamic changes the IC faces and how we need to stay ahead of them. Moreover, we have a broad range of fairly quickly moving factors that are hard to interpret in near-real time.

The changes that have occurred in the areas of operations that we are finding ourselves in are immense. Despite the fiscal challenges that we are likely to face in the coming decade, the increases in the demand for intelligence are unprecedented right now, and I see only an increase in the demand for even more and better intelligence in the future. We really have to stress the training and education of the language and the cultural knowledge, and we really are going to have to step up our game. I think where the DIA will move toward is a greater understanding of the culture of the societal structures within these regions that we are operating in, particularly places like Africa, places like the Middle East, places like South Asia, places like Southeast Asia or the Pacific Basin, we have to have what I would call a much better fingertip feel for the environments in which we are operating within. And we will do that through presence, we will do that through a very well-trained, sophisticated, well-resourced group of intelligence professionals.

LTG Flynn addressed/recommended several efforts that are related to this AIJ and deserve highlighting to our membership. DIA is engaged in a Vision 2020 effort that will address implications for the Intelligence Community as it re-focuses on more strategic issues after a decade of support to tactical operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world; focuses on priorities and expectations for the IC in today’s mobile and data-immersed environment;
and determines how the IC can integrate big data analysis and open source intelligence with traditional tradecraft in order to continue to evolve as true curators and purveyors of knowledge.

The Strategic Context of Joint Vision 2020 is apropos:

The United States will continue to have global interests and be engaged with a variety of regional actors. Transportation, communications, and information technology will continue to evolve and foster expanded economic ties and awareness of international events. Our security and economic interests, as well as our political values, will provide the impetus for engagement with international partners. The joint force of 2020 must be prepared to “win” across the full range of military operations in any part of the world, to operate with multinational forces, and to coordinate military operations, as necessary, with government agencies and international organizations.

LTG Flynn recommended the CJCJS “Decade of War, Volume 1, Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations” (http://blogs.defensenews.com/saxotech-access/pdfs/decade-of-war-lessons-learned.pdf). This reflects excellent analysis and recommendations; it should be required reading for anyone in the discipline. In the decade following 9/11, it became evident that the Cold War model which had guided foreign policy for the previous 50 years no longer fit the emerging global environment. Key changes included: A shift from U.S. hegemony toward national pluralism, the erosion of sovereignty and the impact of weak states, the empowerment of small groups or individuals, and an increasing need to fight and win in the information domain. The introduction to Lesson One, “Understanding the Environment,” talks to the 10+ year focus on the tactical domain:

A complete understanding of the operating environment was often hindered by a focus on traditional adversary information and actions in the US approach to intelligence gathering. This focus impacted the US effectiveness in countering asymmetric and irregular threats from insurgencies and mitigating terrorist and criminal influences. Further, shortages of human intelligence (HUMINT) personnel and interpreters needed to capture critical information from the population, and lack of fusion of this intelligence with other sources, exacerbated the problem. Other intelligence capabilities and platforms proved to be valuable but in short supply, but their numbers surged in both Iraq and Afghanistan as their value was recognized. Similarly, recognizing an unmet requirement, manned expeditionary intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms were developed and fielded, including Task Force Odin and Project Liberty. Units also learned to employ different kinds of ISR capabilities according to their local environment.

Because the traditional intelligence effort tended to focus on enemy groups and actions, it often neglected “white” information about the population that was necessary for success in population-centric campaigns such as counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Local commanders needed information about ethnic and tribal identities, religion, culture, politics, and economics. Intelligence products provided information about enemy actions but were insufficient for other information needed at the local level. Furthermore, there were no pre-established priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) or other checklists or templates that could serve as first-order approximations for what units needed to know for irregular warfare. As a result, processes for obtaining information on “white” population-centric issues tended to be based on discovery learning, and were not consistently passed to follow-on units.

LTG Flynn also recommended remarks by the CJCJS Chairman, GEN (USA) Martin Dempsey, at the Joint Warfighting Conference 2012 (http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?ID=1698). I found one vignette of the Chairman to be particularly insightful: “It is telling that the first time I met someone from the State Department, I was a Lieutenant Colonel with 22 years of service. Today, you can hardly find a Lieutenant who hasn’t worked with USAID, State, or Justice. And that is a very good thing.”

Be sure to read COL Spracher’s “From the Editor’s Desk” in this AIJ. Bill is a FAO and brings some personal insights and perspectives to the broader topic of Cultural Intelligence. It’s all about providing that “fingertip feel” that is so crucial for operational success.

The National Military Intelligence Association and Foundation held their annual National Military Intelligence Awards Banquet in May with several hundred attendees honoring the best in Military Intelligence. Nineteen of our nation’s finest intelligence professionals were recognized by NMIA/NMIF and their parent organizations. Awards were given to personnel from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Coast Guard, the Guard and Reserves, and the national intelligence agencies. Also attending were the directors or deputies of these intelligence organizations/
THE EDITOR’S DESK

From the Editor’s Desk…

This edition of AIJ focuses on a theme with which all present and former Foreign Area Officers can easily identify. “Cultural Intelligence and Regional Issues” speaks to the intersection between intelligence and foreign affairs, between warfighting in a kinetic sense and support to warfighting through diplomacy. During a May 2012 visit to the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, CA, Secretary of the Army John McHugh insisted that “language skills and cultural understanding are critical tools for accomplishing missions in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. As the Army downsizes,” McHugh continued, “soldiers with language skills will become even more critical to the force’s mission success. The relevancy of this program—this entire mission—I think has never been greater… As our number and our footprint get smaller, I think we would expect those who remain behind to be more culturally aware, to be more adept at language.”

This priority of focus for FAOs and intelligence officers alike was echoed by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, former Director of DIA and NGA and also former Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, during his keynote address at the most recent FAO Association annual black-tie dinner in April 2012. He asserted the main reason he accepted the invitation to speak was that he had always appreciated the tremendous contributions FAOs have made, and continue to make, to the overall U.S. intelligence effort. As a former Defense Attaché myself who was handed my diploma from the Joint Military Attaché School in 1993 by then-DIA Director Clapper, I need little convincing about the value of language capacity and foreign area expertise to both an MI soldier’s career kitbag and our country’s national security. Likewise, observers have often commented since 9/11 that more emphasis needs to be put on learning about the cultures and languages of the hard-to-predict next battleground, which puts a premium on HUMINT, that least sexy discipline that takes years to mature properly.

Secretary McHugh’s expectation for “those who remain behind” reminds us that intelligence personnel often represent not only a significant portion of those who remain behind after a combat force departs an area of conflict, but also those who are infiltrated in at the onset of the conflict ahead of regular troops to lay the groundwork and conduct what we refer to as “intelligence preparation of the battlespace.” American citizens will never forget news images of CIA and Special Forces personnel on horseback in the rugged mountains of Afghanistan in 2001, at the beginning of our nation’s longest war, fought not against another nation-state but against international terrorists, or photo clips of a U.S. helicopter lifting off the roof of the U.S. embassy in Saigon, with an eclectic mix of U.S.

Joe Keefe

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officials and South Vietnamese colleagues at the end of that previously longest war in 1975. Intelligence agents were likely part of the last contingent to escape that day, and some others stayed behind to continue their mission clandestinely.

The Defense Intelligence Agency just celebrated its 50th anniversary in 2011, and one of the iconic figures remembered when he passed away early that year was Army MG Homer Smith, the U.S Defense Attaché who oversaw that painful evacuation from Vietnam, along with efforts to assist orphan children and Vietnamese who had helped the U.S. government escape retribution at the hands of the new Communist regime. DIA has recently established a Center for Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) within its Human Capital learning enterprise, which also consists of JMAS, JMITC (Joint Military Intelligence Training Center), and other elements. LREC is concentrating on developing intelligence personnel with cultural and regional expertise, while JMITC accomplishes this same goal in part through its longstanding Combined Strategic Intelligence Training Program (CSITP), in which mid-level intelligence officers from all over the world come to DIA for seven weeks, mix with a cohort of U.S. intelligence students, and practice international engagement. Since 2008 I have been fortunate in being able to contribute a small part to the CSITP’s 1-week National Intelligence Course by presenting a class titled “Intelligence Engagement: Valuing Cultural Differences,” essentially a session on cultural intelligence in an international milieu. Similarly, at a more senior level, other foreign officers come to DIA to attend the 2-week International Intelligence Fellows Program (IIFP) at the National Intelligence University’s Center for International Engagement, where they are able to explore such topics as intelligence support to combating terrorism and the role of intelligence in peace operations while rubbing shoulders with fellow students from U.S. combatant command J2s and select agencies of the IC.

The U.S. armed services now realize the importance of these special skills for their warfighters, providing a force multiplier in an era of declining budgets, personnel drawdowns, and unexpected missions around the world. For instance, in 2007 Army leadership directed the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G3 “to serve as executive agent in developing a service-wide solution for career continuum and pre-deployment learning about foreign cultures and languages. The Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy (ACFLS) was the response…now being implemented as an enterprise of culture and foreign language advisors (CFLAs) and training developers positioned in many TRADOC ‘schoolhouses’ and other training institutions to provide education in culture and language.”2 The U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence at Fort Huachuca, AZ, is a key gateway for this type of training. Its official publication, the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, just this spring published an edition titled “Language & Cultural Competency,” which contains some excellent articles along the same lines as those included in this edition of AIJ. The Army is not the only service promoting such awareness. In August 2011 Defense Secretary Panetta sent a memo to all the military departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the COCOMs, and defense agencies stating: “Language, regional and cultural skills are enduring warfighting competencies that are critical to mission readiness in today’s dynamic global environment. Our forces must have the ability to effectively communicate with and understand the cultures of coalition forces, international partners, and local populations.”

In the last issue of the Journal you were given a preview of this issue with a provocative piece on “The Regional Knowledge System” by two professors from the U.S. Military Academy’s Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering, who discussed in part the establishment of West Point’s Center for Languages, Cultures, and Regional Studies. COL Hummel had promised another article for this latest issue of AIJ titled “Intercultural Competence for Future Leaders: Addressing Cultural Knowledge and Perception at West Point,” but her deployment to Afghanistan to assist its nascent military academy complicated collaboration with her co-authors. Now retired, she has passed the baton to two civilian professors who are finalizing that piece this fall for the next issue. Still, a wealth of outstanding manuscripts poured in when we announced the theme for the present issue, and I am pleased to offer them to you in the following pages.

We tried to “span the world” in this issue by encouraging submissions from every geographical region and from as many international authors as possible. As with other recent issues, China is well-represented. A Chinese graduate student here in the U.S. whom I met at a conference at National Defense University a couple of years ago, Xiuye Zhao, offers his country’s perspective on the U.S. strategic position in East Asia. Almost as if written as a counterpoint, but strictly serendipitous, is an essay by Lt Col Donald Brunk of Air Combat Command on the appropriate U.S. response to China’s emergence on the world scene. This article reflects a first in what we hope is a regular exchange with the FAO Association’s journal International Affairs. I have arranged with the FAOA editor to provide him a regional-focused article from AIJ on occasion that can be reprinted in that organization’s journal, and FAOA will reciprocate. This is just one more way professional associations with mutual interests and overlapping goals can cooperate. While on the subject of FAOA, let me announce here that this organization has just...
presented the inaugural FAOA LTG Vernon A. Walters Award for the best NIU master’s thesis in international affairs, area studies, foreign policy, critical language issues, FAO policy, attaché affairs, cultural intelligence, or a related topic. Named for an intelligence legend who also happened to be the first NMIA President in 1974, the award was presented at NIU’s July 2012 graduation ceremony at the same time as a longstanding NMIA writing award. Our respective associations’ journals offer their award winners the opportunity to have their work published. We are delighted there is a great deal of mutual admiration and collaboration between NMIA and FAOA, and this edition of ALJ epitomizes the sort of creative work valued by both.

Other articles in the following pages dealing with Asia include one by NIU faculty member Jim Dillard on cultural intelligence lessons learned from Vietnam and a historical treatise about the OSS’s role in Korea by Bill Streifer, who also contributed an article about the OSS in Manchuria for the last issue of the Journal. Not to be outdone by the Chinese, we have a Russian contribution to this issue, with Boris Volodarsky revealing past KGB activities inside the U.S. His background as a former GRU and Spetsnaz (special forces) operative gives him bona fides to talk about such sensitive times in our bilateral history. Repeat ALJ author James McGinley of the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity examines development challenges in Afghanistan and compares them with similar efforts in Africa. East Asia expert Maj Joe Barry has turned an outstanding paper he wrote for the Air Command and Staff College on UN intelligence—a sensitive subject within that organization but less so than in the past—into an even better article for ALJ. I myself picked up on the theme of intelligence in the UN with a piece about my own time wearing a blue beret two decades ago in the remote Western Sahara, when the UN liked to talk about “culture” and the “information” function but shied away from admitting it was also in the “intelligence” business.

Africa receives a lot of attention in this issue with articles by recently retired Dutch Army MAJ Rob Sentse on his UN peacekeeping experience in Sudan, another on the seemingly never-ending conflict in Sudan by CPT Chris Collins, and one by repeat ALJ author Darlene Holseth on the threat posed by the terrorist group Al Shabaab in Somalia and other corners of East Africa. Moving across the Red Sea and Persian Gulf to the Middle East, Anita Rai of the UK discusses the ever-growing threat posed by Iran while SSgt Adam Furtado, recently returned from a deployment to Qatar, explores the uniqueness of that fairly tranquil oasis in the Gulf and explains what makes it different from some of its troubled neighbors also in the uncomfortable shadow of Iran. I must admit I was disappointed to have only one submission covering the part of the world I know best—Latin America—but regrettably the author’s agency at the last minute pulled an incisive piece on the reemergence of the Falkland Islands controversy written by one of my NIU students. She has no clue why, but that is one of the factors with which I as editor of an unclassified private journal must grapple, i.e., authors who are government employees must have their manuscripts cleared for public release and occasionally there are hang-ups that are difficult to fathom. Consequently, you budding authors out there need to heed this warning: get your superiors on board early with your outside research and ensure you can convince them of the independent nature of writing for publication about potentially sensitive topics. In other words, this is precisely what is meant by the term “disclaimer.”

We are fortunate to read in the following pages a couple of illustrious offerings that do not deal with a particular geographic region but are more universal in nature. Navy LT Danny Sheinis examines the connections between terrorism, organized crime, and human trafficking. Army LT Nima Serrafan takes a creative look at using what he calls “brown teams” vice the more typical “red teams” in assessing the cultural repercussions of counterinsurgency.

Finally, as always, we are pleased to provide a smattering of articles that stray from our announced theme, with a couple harking back to a previous, highly popular issue on “Intelligence and the Rule of Law.” Aspiring lawyer Allen Miller discusses Congressional oversight of the CIA and

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Lee Lacy of the Army Command and General Staff College examines the WikiLeaks phenomenon in light of a similar high-visibility leak of a generation ago, the “Pentagon Papers.” Moving to the education arena, Michael Landon-Murray holds forth on how certification for teaching intelligence might be accomplished, while Dusty Farned surveys, through a cultural lens, the controversial issue of ROTC returning to Ivy League campuses after an extended absence of several decades. We proudly offer another in a prolific series of World War I & II history pieces by Ken Campbell and, as usual, we present some outstanding book reviews and review essays.

In conclusion, I am confident you will find this issue of AIJ chock-full of illuminating essays that will whet the appetite of intelligence officers and FAOs alike (many of us qualify on both counts). Looking ahead, the second issue of the Journal for 2012 will focus on “Information Warfare.” The two issues in 2013 will examine themes related to a past and a future NMIA event, respectively. The first will explore the theme “Intelligence/Information Support to Small Unit Operations” and the second “Intelligence Education and Training.” We anticipate stimulating interest in the latter with our 1-day workshop on November 15 to be co-hosted by the local chapters of NMIA and IAFIE (International Association for Intelligence Education), details of which are forthcoming. However, as a sneak preview, the always entertaining Dr. Mark Lowenthal has agreed to keynote the event; Mark kicked off a previous issue of AIJ with his provocative article on intelligence reform and transformation. Anyone interested in writing about any of the three themes above, or anything else for that matter, is encouraged to contact me or my Associate Editor, Kel McClanahan, at aijeditor@nmia.org.

Happy autumn and happy reading!

Bill Spracher

Notes
2 Sterilla A. Smith, “From the Editor,” Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (PB 34-12-1), January-March 2012.
3 Leon E. Panetta, “Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities in the Department of Defense (DoD),” memorandum to key DoD decision-makers, August 10, 2011.
The OSS in Korea:
Operation Eagle

by Bill Streifer

At the time I was in charge of the cryptography section in Kunming HQ and I got to see all high level radio traffic for all of China... I was very well informed about what was going on everywhere in China. When Eagle got chased out of Korea we all laughed and said that Col. Bird had fouled up again.

- Dr. John W. Brunner

BLACKLIST was General Douglas MacArthur’s basic outline plan for the occupation of Japan once hostilities during World War II had ended. It called for the disarmament and demobilization of enemy forces, the establishment of a military government, the preservation of law and order, and the apprehension of Japanese war criminals. It also called for the recovery, relief, and repatriation of Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees “without delay.” By war’s end, 32,400 men remained interned in POW camps in Japan and Korea (which had been under Japanese control since 1910). The American public, however, was unaware of the neglect, maltreatment, and abuse the prisoners had suffered at the hands of the Japanese. Nor were they aware that 30 percent of American POWs had already died in captivity. And yet, according to a February 1945 article in The New York Times, the “Japanese are not invariably cruel to their prisoners.”

Although POW rescue work was the purview of the War Department, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)—“America’s first intelligence agency” and the forerunner of the CIA—was invited to join the effort, providing cover for intelligence operations in those areas. In January 1945, U.S. Secretary of State Edward Stettinius informed the Director of the OSS, Major General William J. Donovan, of the State Department’s effort to learn what was happening to American prisoners inside Japanese POW and internment camps. In March, Colonel Richard Heppner, the Chief of the OSS in China under Lieutenant General Albert Wedemeyer, ordered the establishment of a new OSS field unit to be based in Hsian, northern China. One thousand miles west of Keijo (now Seoul), Korea, Hsian became the most important base for penetration into north and northeastern China as well as Manchuria and Korea, Japan’s so-called “inner zone.” The following day, Major Gustav Kraus, who was asked to head the new base, left for Hsian with 46 OSS agents. Each OSS “mercy mission” had a different area of operation, and each was named for a bird: Magpie, Duck, Flamingo, Cardinal, Sparrow, Quail, Pigeon, and Raven.

The area of operations for the Eagle mission—named for the bird that symbolized America—was Keijo/Seoul, the future capital of South Korea. Operation Eagle was conducted in accordance with an agreement reached in October 1944 between the OSS and Korean General Lee Bum-suk of the Korean Restoration Army. On April 1, 1945, a meeting was held between Captain Clyde B. Sargent (later the OSS Eagle field commander) and General Lee Bum-suk at a small Tientsin (also known as Tianjin) restaurant in Chungking, China. The bulk of the conversation concerned the “reciprocal advantages” of Korean-American occupation in the war against Japan. Sargent, who had expressed his hope that such cooperation would have the support of all Korean leaders and groups, was invited to visit a Korean colony 12 kilometers north of Chungking along with a delegation from the Korean Provisional Government in exile. At that meeting, Sargent met President Kim Ku, Chairman of the Korean Provisional Government. According to Sargent’s aide-mémoire:

President Kim entered the room, dressed in an attractive, plain Chinese gown, for which he apologized on excuse that he had not been well and was resting. In spite of his 70 years, which he showed completely in both appearance and manner, he bore himself with dignity and composure tempered by modesty and gentleness that seemed incompatible with the patriotic assassin and terrorist of 25 years ago.

The interview consisted largely of “mild indulgences by both sides in exchange of conversational courtesies.” President Kim expressed his appreciation for American interest and his intention to cooperate fully by making
Korean personnel available, including the 37 Korean men who recently arrived from Fuyang in Anhui Province, nearly 600 miles north-northeast of Chungking. Sargent then emphasized the value to both the Allies in general and the Koreans in particular that can result from Korean-American cooperation. Sargent later said he was “greatly impressed” by the soldiers from Anhui, calling them “intelligent, alert, and keen.” Many of the men, Sargent was told, were college graduates and spoke very passable English. Later, Sargent suggested to General Lee Bumsuk that the entire group participate in the training program for the Eagle Project. The men were later assigned to either the intelligence squad or the communications squad and trained by OSS officers to perform a number of skills including map reading, wireless communications, intelligence gathering, intelligence communications, special skills for guerrilla activities, explosives, scaling cliffs, and marksmanship.

On August 1, the Hsian and Chungking field units in Manchuria were redesignated the OSS Central and South Base Commands, and an OSS Northeastern Command was activated. Then, effective August 16, the three Base Commands were deactivated and reactivated as the Hsian, Chungking, and Korean Base Commands under Major Robert B. Moore, Major Gustav J. Kraus, and Lieutenant Colonel Willis H. Bird, respectively.

The sudden end of World War II on August 15 caught the OSS by surprise. In a message from Heppner to Donovan, “Although we have been caught with our pants down, we will do our best to pull them up in time.” Consequently, Wedemeyer immediately issued a “comprehensive directive” to various special agencies under his control to locate and evacuate POWs. Upon receipt of news that President Truman had accepted the unconditional surrender of Japan, Operation Eagle departed Hsian on August 16 at 4:30 a.m. for Keijo aboard a C-47 cargo plane. Lieutenant Colonel Willis Bird of Lansdowne, Pennsylvania, Deputy Chief of the OSS in China, was in command. In addition to 19 Americans and three Koreans, Bird also invited Harry R. Lieberman, chief news editor of the Office of War Information (OWI) – China Branch, and a photographer. According to Professor Maochun Yu, the author of *OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War*, “Bird, ever publicly conscious and eager to gain fame by ‘liberating’ Korea single-handedly, added a Mr. Lieberman—an OWI writer—to the Eagle mission in violation of Heppner’s specific orders.”

![Official credentials of LTC (USA) Willis H. Bird, Deputy Chief of the OSS in China and Commander, Operation Eagle.](image-url)
Without knowing what kind of reception it would receive upon its arrival, the OSS team was armed with revolvers, tommy-guns, and some hand grenades, “just in case trouble developed.” En route, the plane’s radio was used to receive late news flashes. As their plane approached the Shandong Peninsula, due west of the Korean Peninsula, a radio report spoke of fighting in many areas, attacks on American aircraft carriers by Japanese kamikaze planes, and the Japanese Emperor’s inability to enforce his own cease-fire order. After a conference with his staff and air crew, Bird ordered the pilot to return to base. While the C-47 was undergoing repairs overnight, a wing tip was accidentally damaged. In need of further repair, and unable to obtain replacement parts in Hsian, the crew left early the following morning for Chungking to obtain a replacement aircraft. And at 5:45 a.m. on August 18, Operation Eagle departed Hsian airport for Korea in excellent flying weather.

At 9:15 a.m., as the C-47 approached within 500 miles of Keijo, the plane’s radio operator, First Lieutenant Meredith I. Price, attempted to establish contact with the Japanese. Colonel Bird and Captain Ryong C. Hahm, Bird’s Korean-American translator, began broadcasting a series of messages to announce their arrival: “American Military Mission calling airfield in Keijo, Korea… Our only mission is to provide aid and comfort to Allied prisoners of war in Korea. Will you give us landing instructions?” At 11:40 a.m., just as the C-47 crossed the Yellow Sea, the Japanese replied, “We are expecting you. We guarantee you safe landing.” While approaching the airfield, the Eagle mission saw “factory smokestacks and buildings unmolested by the bombs that devastated industrial facilities in Japan.” At 11:56 a.m., the C-47 landed and the plane was met by Lieutenant General Yoshio Kotsuki (Commander-in-Chief of Japanese forces in Korea), his Chief of Staff, Major General Junjiro Ihara (the commander of the airfield), and a company of 50,000 Japanese troops. Lieberman later wrote:

The Japanese at Keijo still seemed to be in the war business on a big scale and there was little to suggest that they were part of a surrendering army… On the field, platoons and machine-gun companies marched back and forth, with Japanese sergeants barking their orders. There were 50 planes, including about 20 zeroes, parked on the field, with flight patrols taking off and landing regularly. Japanese enlisted men in and about the hangars stared at the Americans with immobile expressions. In front of one barracks, a white-shirted officer was practicing executioner sweeps with his long samurai sword.

The POWs who had survived captivity were generally underfed, suffered from various tropical diseases, deprived of much needed medicines and medical treatment, and suffered abuse and inhumanities at the hands of their Japanese captors and “cruel” Korean guards.

Although several of the Japanese officers spoke English, the proceedings were carried out in Japanese with Captain Hahm interpreting. Bird immediately explained the purpose of the mission and requested assistance from the Japanese in accomplishing it:

Bird: I am here at the direction of Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces in the China Theater, as an initial pre-Allied occupation representative to bring whatever help is needed to Allied prisoners of war to make preliminary arrangements for their future evacuation in accordance with the terms of the peace negotiations.

Ihara: Then you are not here to negotiate a surrender?

Bird: No. Our mission is purely humanitarian, to see that the prisoners are safe and to bring them what immediate help they need.

Although the Japanese pledged to supply a report with the location of the POW camps, the number of Allied prisoners of war in Korea, and a breakdown by nationality, they later reneged on their promise. As the discussions dragged on with “evasive statements by the Japanese,” Ihara said his troops had received a “cease fire” order from Tokyo but that he had no authority to let anyone visit the prison camp. “You must wait for orders from our government,” Ihara said. “And you must leave. It is not safe for you here.”

When Bird asked to see the prisoners, the Japanese Airfield Commander’s Chief of Staff assured him that “the prisoners are all safe and well and that we need have no concern for their welfare.” The reality, of course, was quite different. The POWs who had survived captivity were generally underfed, suffered from various tropical diseases, deprived of much needed medicines and medical treatment, and suffered abuse and inhumanities at the hands of their Japanese captors and “cruel” Korean guards:

When the U.S. forces under the command of Major General John R. Hodge occupied southern Korea in September 1945, Lieutenant-Colonel Yuzuru Noguchi, the commandant of the Keijo POW camp,
was arrested and accused of war crimes. Two years later, Noguchi stood before the Eighth Army Military Commission at the Yokohama War Crimes Trials where he received a prison sentence of twenty-two years with hard labor for failing to discharge his duties as commander of all Korea POW camps, by permitting persons under his supervision at camps in Keijo, Konan, and Jinsen to beat prisoners, [and for forcing POWs] to work while sick and abusing them in other ways.33

While the crew waited for the fuel to arrive, Colonel Shibuda and Major Hideo Uyeda, a 29-year-old “professional soldier” and a graduate of Japan’s military academy, entertained the Americans with bottles of Kirin beer and a large amount of sake. According to Lieberman, when Uyeda asked for the name of the U.S. Air Force song, the Americans “let loose with a tumultuous chorus of Off We Go Into the Wild Blue Yonder led by Captain John Wagoner, Air Transport Command, as Uyeda beamed, beating time on the table with his fingers.” As soon as the Americans finished, Uyeda began singing the Japanese Air Force song, Kubasa (Fighting Wing). When the fuel failed to arrive, the Americans were permitted to remain at the airfield overnight. The following morning at 3:00 a.m., LTC Bird sent a radio message to LTG Wedemeyer in Hsian informing him of the new developments. However, he neglected to mention the “beer, sake and Japanese songs.”35

Arrived safely with friendly and helpful attitude from Japanese Command. They state all prisoners of war are safe and well and no need to be concerned due to fact there are as yet no instructions from their government. Our presence embarrassing and they suggest we return China and come back later. We will stay nite and return tomorrow with gasoline they have been kind enough to provide. Would like to return on mission when formal peace is signed.36

Later that morning, discussions continued with further attempts to remain in Keijo, including a demand by Bird to “place our case before Governor-General Abe.” The pressure of the Eagle’s demands brought unpleasant responses from the Japanese. They flatly stated that Abe did not wish to see the Eagle crew, “we had no credentials and therefore no right to be in Keijo, that they had no instructions from their government, and that we would have to leave immediately.” The atmosphere became tense when Bird, once again, asked for an audience with the Japanese generals and to remain in Keijo. At this point, the Eagle mission was issued an unsigned “receipt” to show that its members had been in Keijo and that they had presented their credentials to the Japanese. When Bird asked for the receipt to be signed, Uyeda “spouted out a stream of profanity and a stinging reference to ‘inferior persons.’” Shortly afterward, two Japanese tanks were deployed and trench mortars were readied outside the building where the Eagle mission was housed. After the Japanese provided fuel—and with the tanks’ 37 millimeter cannon and machineguns covering the Americans as they marched back to their plane—Colonel Bird and his men departed Keijo at 4:20 that afternoon. According to Captain Patrick Teel, “It’ll just take five minutes to make us all dead ducks.” Flight Officer Edward McGee, the
C-47 pilot, later summed up the bizarre sequence of events this way: “If someone had told me two weeks ago I’d be in a set-up like this, I’d have turned him over to the loco ward. It’s a dream, or else it’s the sake... I’m looking forward to seeing those boys again.”48

Since the 500 gallons of fuel provided were insufficient to return to Hsian, Operation Eagle flew instead to Wei-Hsien, where Operation Duck had already taken place. Upon arrival, messages were sent to the Japanese garrison that occupied the field and to the Chinese commander in the area, a friend of General Lee Bum-suk, Colonel Bird’s Korean advisor. Radio messages were also sent to Hsian to inform them of what had transpired during their mission. While a detail of Chinese troops guarded the plane, Operation Eagle spent the night at the residence of the Chinese commander as his guests. The following day, Japanese Imperial Headquarters sent a message to General MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), explaining why the Japanese had refused to permit the Eagle mission (and others) from meeting with Allied POWs:39

Some officers and men of the Allied forces, without giving a previous notice, came by airplane to some places under Japanese control for the purpose of making contact with, or giving comfort to, prisoners of war or civilian internees, while the arrangements for the cessation of hostilities have not yet been formally made... Since visits of the Allied officers and men before such arrangements are made, even if notified in advance, are likely to hamper the realization of our desire to effect smoothly and satisfactorily the cessation of hostilities and surrender of arms, we earnestly request you to prevent the reoccurrence of such incidents. We have made those who came to Mukden, Keijo and Hong Kong return to their bases.40

LTC Bird then received instructions from OSS Headquarters to return to Keijo immediately, even if it resulted in temporary internment. Instead, Bird flew to Chungking, China, the next day to express his fear that a return to Keijo meant the execution of the Eagle members and crew.41 When LTG Wedemeyer later heard Lieberman’s report on OWI radio, he became infuriated. He believed that Bird had disgraced the armed forces because his actions—meals, drinks, and song—could “easily be construed,” according to Professor Yu, “as fraternization with the Japanese troops.” He was particularly “disgusted” to hear that Bird had invited Lieberman and a photographer aboard while neglecting to bring along food or medical supplies for the prisoners of war. Therefore, LTG Wedemeyer immediately ordered all POW rescue efforts in Korea be “reconstituted and completely divorced from Eagle project,” and Wedemeyer’s Chief of Staff recommended sending Bird to the United States to face immediate disciplinary action.42 “Panicked by Wedemeyer’s rage,” COL William P. Davis, the senior-most OSS officer in Chungking, suggested to Heppner that Bird be immediately replaced as the head of Operation Eagle. Heppner complied, instructing Davis to “take whatever steps you deem necessary to keep Bird out of contact with all OSS persons outside OSS and theatre Headquarters.” Heppner then briefed Donovan on developments, urging him “take whatever steps may be necessary to protect the organization [OSS].” The following day, Donovan angrily replied: “Make sure that action [be] taken [against Bird] for violation of your orders. If necessary, send Bird home at once or, in your discretion, prefer charges.”43

Later, without referring to the Office of Strategic Services or suggesting that the “mercy mission” to Seoul was an intelligence operation, a syndicated story in the American press described Operation Eagle, the failed OSS mission to Korea, in this way: “An Allied mercy crew which landed at Keijo, Korea in the midst of 50,000 Japanese soldiers was alternately cursed, threatened, wined and entertained before it took off again with 500 gallons of Japanese gasoline.”44

Author’s Note: I greatly appreciate the assistance provided by Dr. John W. Brunner (former OSS in China) and Carole Bird (Willis Bird’s daughter).

Notes
5“The Office of Strategic Services: America’s First Intelligence Agency,” CIA.gov.
7Maochun Yu, OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War, Yale University Press, 1996.
8Ibid.
10Captain Sargent’s aide-mémoires, April 1-3, 1945.
11Ibid.
12Ibid.
13Fuyang, Anhui is spelled “Foo-Yang, Anhwei” in Captain Sargent’s aide-mémoire.
14This information was obtained from an unwanted “ghost image” off Captain Sargent’s mimeograph machine, not directly from his aide-mémoire.
15Captain Sargent’s aide-mémoires, April 1-3, 1945.
16“Early Korean Immigrants to America,” pp. 63-64.
17General Order #6 (August 1, 1945), #13 (August 17, 1945), and #14 (August 18, 1945), OSS, China.
18OSS in China, p. 231.
19Ibid., p. 233.
22OSS in China, p. 233.
23“Report on Mission to Korea.”
24“Japs Bring Up Tanks and Order POW Relief Mission Out of the Country.”
25Ibid.
26Ibid.
27Ibid.
28Ibid.
29At the time, U.S. Army intelligence believed there were “numerous” POW camps in Korea when there were in fact only three: Keijo (Seoul) and Jinsen (Inch’on) in southern Korea, and Konan (Hungnam) in the northeast, one hundred miles from the Soviet border.
30“Report on Mission to Korea.”
31“Japs Bring Up Tanks and Order POW Relief Mission Out of the Country.”
32Ibid.
33Yuzuru Noguchi, Yokohama War Crimes Trials, October 14, 1947, photo and inscription.
34“Japs Bring Up Tanks and Order POW Relief Mission Out of the Country.”
35Ibid.
36“Report on Mission to Korea.”
37“Japs Bring Up Tanks and Order POW Relief Mission Out of the Country.”
38Ibid.
40Ibid.
41Field Photographer Hobbs, who accompanied Bird to Chungking, developed the film taken during the Eagle mission, the first pictorial records from Korea since the war began. “Report on Mission to Korea.”
42OSS in China, p. 234.
43Ibid., pp. 234-235.

Bill Streifer, BA, MBA, is the author of fiction and non-fiction on military and intelligence topics during World War II and the Cold War. His current book project, The Flight of the Hog Wild, by Bill Streifer and Irek Sabitov with an introduction by Dr. Benjamin C. Garrett, Senior Scientist at the FBI’s forensic WMD laboratory, concerns a possible intelligence/aerial reconnaissance mission over Soviet-held northern Korea. On August 29, 1945, an American B-29 Superfortress on a POW supply mission was shot down by Soviet fighters, an incident which some believe may have been the first military encounter of the Cold War. Bill’s earlier article, “Operation Cardinal: ‘So You Must Be a Spy’, “ appeared in AIJ, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2011.